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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Major Developments in 1990 at the
UN Commission on Human Rights
Reed Brody, Penny Parker,and David Weissbrodt*
The forty-sixth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
met from 29 January to 9 March 1990. It was the first meeting of the Commission following the democratic changes in Central Europe, the suppression
of the pro-democracy movement in China, and the US invasion of Panama.
The Commission also met after the General Assembly had called for an
enlargement of its membership to remedy the under-representation of third
world countries, while asking the Commission to study ways of making its
work more effective.
The Commission adopted eighty-one resolutions and sixteen decisions,
of which sixty-two resolutions and thirteen decisions were adopted by consensus. 1 Among the principal results of the session, which was marked by
a growing north-south split, were resolutions on Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Myanmar (Burma), and the US invasion of Panama. The Commission failed to act, however, on resolutions regarding China and Iraq, or
to break new ground on thematic issues. It also failed to reach any decision
on enhancing its working methods-a decision later taken by the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) in May 1990.
The outgoing chairman, Marc Bossuyt of Belgium, began the session
with a minute of silence to remember the late Andrei Sakharov as well as
all those who died during the year in the struggle for human rights. UnderSecretary-General Jan Martenson noted that the past year had seen the

* This article is adapted from one which appeared in 44 ICJ Review (1990).
1. In 1989 the Commission also made most of its decisions by consensus. For general reading
about the Commission, see Brody & Weissbrodt, Major Developments at the 1989 Session
of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 11 Hum. Rts. Q. 586, 611 (1989); Weissbrodt,
Country-Related and Thematic Developments at the 1988 Session of the UN Commission
on Human Rights, 10 Hum. Rts. Q. 544 (1988); H. Tolley, The UN Commission on
Human Rights (1987).
Human Rights Quarterly 12 (1990) 559-588 c 1990 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
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adoption by the General Assembly of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child 2 and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.3 In
addition, he noted, a Draft Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Their Families is in the final stage of elaboration
by the General Assembly. 4 Curiously, he did not refer to the International
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries which was also adopted by the General Assembly.
Purificacion V. Quisumbing (Philippines) was elected chair of the session. Todor Ditchev (Bulgaria), Kongit Sinegiorgis (Ethiopia), and Zelmira
Regazzoli (Argentina) were elected to represent their respective regions on
the Bureau, and Ross Hynes (Canada) was elected as rapporteur, giving the
Bureau the participation of three women for the first time. During the session,
the Commission heard speeches by President Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland,
the vice president of the Sudan, and the foreign ministers of Ireland (who
represented the twelve European Community (E.C.) countries), Austria, Cyprus, and Guatemala, the deputy foreign ministers of Hungary, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, and the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees.
The Commission also witnessed a radical shift in the positions of Eastern
European countries. For example, Bulgaria and Hungary voted for scrutiny
of China, Cuba, and Iraq. While the USSR voted against the first two resolutions and did not participate in the vote on the third, it put forth strong
proposals to increase the role of the Human Rights Commission in the future.
The Hungarian secretary of state for foreign affairs even proposed creation
of a special rapporteur to review the situation of those imprisoned for their
political beliefs as well as of a commission that the secretary-general could
dispatch in emergency situations to pursue on-site inquiries. (Interestingly,
Yugoslavia, as chair of the nonaligned group, and a former advocate of a
more active role for the Commission, proposed severe limits on the Commission's work.-) At the same time, abstentions by most Latin American
countries resulted in the failure of the resolutions on China and Iraq.
Before and during the session, drafting groups continued work on draft
declarations on the rights of human rights defenders, the rights of mentally
ill persons, and the rights of minorities.

2.
3.
4.
5.

G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Press Release GA/7977, at 325 (1990).
G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. Press Release GA7977, at 406 (1990).
See G.A. Res. 44/155, U.N. Press Release GA/7977, at 453 (1990).
See Quaker United Nations Office-Geneva, United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, 46th Session, 29 Jan.-9 Mar. 1990 (1990).
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i. ENLARGEMENT AND "ENHANCEMENT"
The Commission is presently composed of eleven members from African
states, ten from the "Western European and Others Group" (WEO), 6 eight
from Latin America and the Caribbean, nine from Asia, and five from Eastern
Europe. Although the WEO nations have played a leading role in the development of the Commission, it is clear that the developing countries are
currently under-represented; fully half the western and eastern European
states are represented on the Commission, for instance, while fewer than
one-quarter of African and Asian countries have seats.
The regional imbalance has received greater attention as the Commission
has become increasingly politicized and polarized. Regional blocs have
taken on increased importance over the years.7 In the developing countries,
these blocs are often able to prevent or control measures sought to be taken
against one of the region's governments. Bloc solidarity has long prevented
public Commission initiatives in Africa (outside southern Africa). The disproportionate scrutiny of Latin American countries in the 1980s, combined
with the highly political US campaign to condemn Cuba from 1987 to the
present, has caused the Latin American bloc to consolidate. The "Group of
8" now effectively determines the limits of resolutions on Chile, El Salvador,
and Guatemala and probably would prevent initiatives on Colombia and
Peru.
The Asian group had long been divided by a diversity of cultures, languages, and forms of government. Nevertheless, the Asian group combined
in 1989 to limit substantially a French initiative on Myanmar (Burma). In
1990, the nonaligned movement's Group of 77 began, for the first time, to
meet regularly and to exert its weight at the Commission. At the same time,
the WEO group votes as a bloc in favor of all country resolutions except
those on South Africa and the Occupied Territories and, with the exception
of Sweden, against initiatives from the developing countries on issues of
development, mercenaries, and economic, social, and cultural rights. The
Eastern European countries, as a result of the changes sweeping that region,
are coming to ally themselves increasingly with WEO positions, thus setting
the stage for an increased north-south confrontation and fueling the move
by developing countries to change the Commission's composition to ensure
equitable representation.

6. The Western European and Others Group (WEO) of countries in the Commission includes
Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and United States.
7. See, e.g., 42 IC Review 25-27 (1989) (resolution on Cuba).
8. The "Group of 8" comprises Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela (Panama was excluded during the tenure of the Noriega government).
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This movement gained momentum when the Sub-Commission in 1989
adopted a resolution critical of China. 9 China has since been lobbying heavily
within the Group of 77 to curtail the powers of the UN in regard to human
rights on the ground of noninterference in the internal affairs of states.
At its 44th session in 1989, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
recommending an expansion in the size of the Commission on the basis of
"equitable geographical distribution." 10 In the same resolution, as a compromise to gain WEO and Eastern European support, the General Assembly
asked the Commission "to examine ways and means of making its work
more effective .... 11
The Commission therefore created an open-ended working group which
met during the session to consider means of "enhancing" the Commission's
work. 12 It soon became clear, however, that the countries of the northWEO and Eastern Europe-and the developing countries grouped in the
Group of 77 had radically different ideas about the meaning of the term
"enhancement."
Among the WEO proposals for enhancement were, first, to create a
permanent mechanism, through the Bureau or the Geneva Permanent Missions, to allow the Commission to respond to urgent situations between
sessions. With the Beijing crackdown on everyone's mind, this proposal ran
into strong opposition from the Group of 77. The WEO nations also proposed
strengthening the Commission's theme mechanisms-the special rapporteurs
and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances- by
giving them longer mandates (three, four, or even five years). This security
of tenure, it was believed, might enable the rapporteurs and the Working
Group to become more active and creative in pursuing their mandates and
more critical of violating countries. Longer terms would also strengthen their
capacity to deal with governments that do not respond to requests for information, that respond with unsatisfactory denials, or that give misleading
3
or inaccurate responses.1
The Group of 77, however, led by India and Pakistan, without real debate

9. Sub-Comm'n Res. 1989/5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/58, at 23 (1989); see Maher &
Weissbrodt, The4lstSession of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 290, 305-06 (1990).
10. G.A. Res. 44/167, U.N. Press Release GA17977, at 473 (1990). The Commission on the
Status of Women was increased in 1989 from 32 members to 45 members to give greater
representation to Third World countries. E.S.C. Res. 1989/45, U.N. Doc. E/1989/INF/7,
at 77 (1989). This action is in line with the decision of the non-aligned states when they
met in May 1990 and decided that "there was an urgent need for a comprehensive review
of the existing distribution of seats on the various organs and bodies of the United Nations
in order to achieve an equitable regional representation." U.N. Doc. A44/409, at 83
(1990).
11. G.A. Res. 44/167, supra note 9, at 473.
12. See Note by the Chairman of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/91, at 1 (1990).
13. Cf. U.N. Doc. ECN.4/19901WG.3/WP.3 (1990) (outline of proposal).
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or input from other regions, rapidly adopted a position paper with several
counter-proposals: to replace the thematic rapporteurs with geographicallybalanced working groups composed of staff from the Geneva Permanent
Missions; to require that all allegations of human rights violations brought
by individuals be channeled through the confidential 1503 procedure of
ECOSOC rather than through the rapporteurs and the working groups; and
to reduce the Sub-Commission to the role of setting standards and producing
14
studies.
The position paper also suggested that all proposed oral statements of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) be submitted in writing at least
twenty-four hours in advance and that a Commission working group be
established to monitor complaints against NGOs.' 5
The Group of 77 position paper called for a depoliticization of the
Commission's work and an end to "aspects of the functioning of the Commission which accentuate judgemental, selective or inquisitorial approaches,
or which would establish an unequal treatment for issues of one category
of human rights as compared to the treatment of other categories."1 6 It thus
sought to ensure priority consideration of apartheid and fair treatment of
7
economic, social, and cultural rights.1
The diametrically opposed proposals left little room for common ground.
The northern countries' proposals did not seem to recognize the Group of
77 view that the Commission has largely followed an agenda weighted
towards the northern countries' concerns, while many of the Group of 77
proposals seemed aimed at eviscerating serious Commission scrutiny of
violations. On the very last day, the closing of the Commission's session
was delayed for eight hours as the two groups sought in vain to achieve
consensus, even as to how the discussions should continue. The WEO group
was anxious to reach agreement on enhancement measures before finalization of the issue of enlargement (to be considered at ECOSOC in May
1990-see below). The Group of 77 appeared interested in postponing the
enhancement debate until next year, by which time enlargement of the
Commission would have already been accomplished. In the end, in a victory
for the Group of 77, the Commission could not even agree to create an
inter-sessional working group to continue debating the matter.
In May 1990, a global agreement was reached at ECOSOC. A resolution,
passed over the sole dissent of the United States, endorsed the urgent need

14. Draft N.A.M. Position Paper 2-3 (1990); see also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/WG.3/WP.6,
at 3 (1990).
15. Draft N.A.M. Position Paper, supra note 13, at 4; see also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/WG.3/
WP.6,at 3-4 (1990). Evidently, the Group of 77 was concerned about NGO statements
that might be critical of governments.
16. Draft N.A.M. Position Paper, supra note 14, at 1-2.
17. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/WG.3/WP.6, at 2 (1990).
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for a more equitable regional representation in the United Nations.1 ECOSOC enlarged the Commission to fifty-three members, adding four to Africa,
three to Asia, and three to Latin America and the Caribbean, to be elected
in May 1991.19 Although the WEO proportionately lost influence from that
decision, they also won on three issues. First, ECOSOC decided that the
Commission can meet exceptionally, when an urgent situation arises regarding human rights violations, provided that a majority of the Commission
so agrees.20 Second, ECOSOC recommended that the term of special rapporteurs be extended to three years rather than two years. 21 Third, ECOSOC
also decided thatthe Commission's Bureau would meet in the week following
22
each session to make suggestions as to the organization of the Commission.

II. COUNTRY SITUATIONS
The Commission also heard reports and passed resolutions concerning the
human rights situations in a number of countries, as well as on other matters.
These topics will be discussed individually.

A. Afghanistan
The Special Rapporteur Felix Ermacora (Austria) reported that the human
rights situation remained grave, with conditions of detention, landmines,
and refugee resettlement of particular concern. 23 In a consensus resolution
under the agenda item of self-determination, the Commission called on all
parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a comprehensive
political solution and the creation of the necessary conditions for peace and
normalcy that would enable Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their
homeland in safety and honor.24 The resolution was adopted despite the
Soviet withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. In another resolution adopted
without a vote, this time on the human rights situation, the Commission
decided to extend the mandate of the special rapporteur for one year, re2
questing him also to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session. 1

18. U.N. Doc. E/1990/L.26, at 2 (1990).
19. See id.
20. Id.

21. Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/25, at 3, 4, 7-8, 11-12 (1990).
C.H.R. Res. 1990/5, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 23, 24 (1990).
C.H.R. Res. 1990/53, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 118, 120

(1990).
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B. Albania
By twenty-seven in favor, three against (China, Cuba, Pakistan), and twelve
abstentions, the government of Albania was asked to provide information
on the concrete manner in which its constitutional and legal measures comply with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
to respond to the specific allegations transmitted to the Commission by its
special rapporteur on the implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
26
or Belief.
Those allegations include the existence of specific legal provisions violating the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, for example,
a decree ordering the annulment of all religious charters, prohibiting all
religious rites, and imposing grave penalties for violators of the decree; an
article of the 1976 constitution forbidding all religious activities and organizations; and an article of the penal code that imposes the death penalty for
7
religious activities in some cases.1
In practice, those laws allegedly have resulted in the persecution and
killing of religious believers, including the alleged killing of priests for baptizing children. 28 The performance of other religious rites, such as making
the sign of the cross, allegedly have resulted in prison sentences of up to
ten years. 29 There reportedly are prisons, concentration camps, and internal
30
exile locations for religious offenders.
The government of Albania denied these allegations in its written response of 30 August 1989, to the special rapporteur? 1 The reports of viola-

26. C.H.R. Res. 1990/49, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/94, at 110, 111
(1990).
27. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/46, at 5 (1990).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6. Several written statements were submitted by the Albanian consulate in Geneva
both prior to and during the Commission's 1990 session. A letter dated 23 January 1990,
described the rights realized by all Albanian citizens, the structural guarantees of the
country's legal systems and the "genuine freedom of conscience" enjoyed by all in the
country. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/57 (1990). A statement dated 19 February 1990, refuted
in general terms the claims of imprisonment of former church members which had been
made by the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/74
(1990).
A third statement, dated 21 February 1990, indicated that a videocassette had been
sent to the Commission refuting "the statements of those who have invented the so-called
tragic killing of the four Prasos brothers." Statements were also filed on 23 February 1990,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/80, and 1 March 1990, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/85, by the
Albanian consulate, including a newspaper interview from the Minister of the Interior,
refuting claims of improper detentions, and a brief response to the "malicious and unfounded accusations" contained in a recent written statement from the delegation of
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tions of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion have been
corroborated by other sources, however.3 2 Given the persistence of the allegations, the resolution could have appointed a special rapporteur for Albania to undertake a first-hand investigation of the alleged violations.
The Albanian government has been reluctant in the past to respond to
criticisms. For five years the Commission attempted to establish a dialogue
with Albania through its confidential 1503 procedure. In 1988, when Albania
again refused to respond, the Commission resolved to consider Albania's
human rights violations under the public procedure authorized by ECOSOC
resolution 1235.13 While the government is generally regarded as having
improved its receptivity to inquiries, the responses for the most part still lack
any specifics.
C. Cambodia
The Commission met for the first time following the Vietnamese withdrawal
from Cambodia, a fact hardly even mentioned in the resolution sponsored
by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on self-determination.3 4 The ASEAN resolution was adopted by a vote of thirty-one to five
(Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Ukraine, USSR), with six abstentions (Belgium, Canada, Hungary, Iraq, Madagascar, Sweden). Bulgaria did not participate in
the vote. The resolution again condemned the "persistent occurrence of
gross and flagrant violations of human rights"

35

by the Vietnamese backed

government while, in the face of the growing threat from the Khmer Rouge,
it again made only a passing and unidentified reference to the importance
of a "non-return to the universally condemned policies and practices of a
recent past...."36

32.
33.

34.
35.
36.

Yugoslavia at the Commission (the Yugoslav statement had charged that the Albanian
government was intentionally encouraging Albanian nationals in the Kosovo district of
Yugoslavia to rebel. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/82 (1990)).
See Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, Human Rights in the
People's Socialist Republic of Albania 75-76, 85-99 (1990).
C.H.R. Res. 1988/17, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 66 (1988).
ECOSOC rejected the recommendation to make public the materials submitted under
ECOSOC Resolution 1503 on Albania and in 1989 there was no mention of Albania
under the 1503 procedure. The Commission did in 1989 adopt a resolution on Albania
received from the Sub-Commission, calling for the government to provide information
on the manner in which its legal system was complying with the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights and to respond to allegations of human rights violations transmitted
by the Special Rapporteur. See Brody & Weissbrodt, Major Developments at the 1989
Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 11 Hum. Rts. Q. 586, 589 (1989).
C.H.R. Res. 1990/9, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 34 (1990).
Id. at 36.
Id.
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D. Chile
Beginning in 1975 the Commission established a working group to study
the human rights situation in Chile.3 1 In 1979 the Commission replaced the
working group with a special rapporteur.3 8 During its 1989 session, the
Commission on Human Rights expressed concern atthe persistence of serious
human rights violations in Chile, as described in the comprehensive report
of the special rapporteur, who referred to cases of murder, abduction, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, prolonged periods of incommunicado
death threats, and the intimidation of oppodetention, political prisoners,
39
nents of the government.
During the adoption of the agenda of the Commission's 1990 session,
the special agenda item on Chile was removed because of the recent democratic elections in that country. As reported by the special rapporteur, the
new democratic government will have the responsibility of restoring the
system of human rights protection that existed prior to the 1973 military
coup d'etatand of ensuring that redress is made for the human rights violations that have occurred since then. 40 Chile's government-elect let it be
known that it wished all scrutiny to end, a position not contested by the
Chilean NGOs in Geneva. The special rapporteur also recommended that
his services be discontinued. 41 The Commission adopted a consensus resolution ending the special rapporteur, but asking the government-elect to
report, at a special meeting of the forty-seventh session in 1991, on the
by the United Nations
follow-up to the recommendations previously adopted
42
in connection with the restoration of human rights.

E. China
The brutal suppression of prodemocracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square
during June 1989 was of obvious concern to many at the Commission. The
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities, which is a subsidiary body to the Commission and meets during
August of each year, had adopted a critical resolution by secret ballot in

37. See Bossuyt, The Development of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights, 6 Hum. Rts. L.J. 179, 181-94, 202-03 (1985).

38. Id.

39. Brody & Weissbrodt, Major Developments at the 1989 Session of the UN Commission
on Human Rights, 11 Hum. Rts. Q. 586, 590 (1989).
40. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/5, at 21 (1990).
41. Id.
42. C.H.R. Res. 1990/78, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/94, at 160, 162
(1990).
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August 1989. The Sub-Commission's resolution, though unprecedented in
its subject matter (it was the first resolution ever passed by the Sub-Commission against one of the five permanent members of the Security Council),
was mild in its criticism, simply noting concern over reports of human rights
abuses, urging clemency for those being detained, and asking the secretarygeneral "to transmit to the Commission on Human Rights information
pro43
vided by the Government of China and by other reliable sources."
The Chinese government lobbied strenuously to defeat the resolution at
the Sub-Commission, but was unsuccessful. The official response of the
government of China to the resolution, contained in the secretary-general's
report, deserves to be reproduced in full because of the brazenness of its
attack on the principle that human rights are of universal concern:
LastJune, there occurred in Beijing a rebellion which was supported by hostile
forces abroad and constituted an attempt to overthrow the legitimate Government
of the People's Republic of China and subvert the socialist system set forth in
the Constitution through violent means. The Chinese Government took resolute
measures to quell the rebellion in the interests of the overwhelming majority of
the Chinese people. This isentirely China's internal affairs and isa matter different
in nature from the question of human rights. However, with the plotting and
encouragement of some Western members, the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted resolution 1989/5 at its
forty-first session. This is a brutal interference in China's internal affairs while
hurting the feeling[s] of the Chinese people. The Spokesman of the Foreign
Ministry of the People's Republic of China issued a statement on 2 September
1989, solemnly declaring the firm objection of the Chinese44 Government to the
resolution and deeming it to be illegal and null and void.
The secretary-general's thirty-three page report also summarized the
well-documented reports of human rights violations in China issued by
Amnesty International, the International League for Human Rights, and the
International Commission of Health Professionals. 45 The resolution against
China which was offered in this session of the Commission sought only an
appeal for clemency for detainees, a welcoming of the government's lifting
of martial law and release of prisoners, and an urging of the government to
continue to take similar, positive measures to protect human rights in the
future.
The debate on China followed the same lines as that which took place
in the Sub-Commission. 46 The floor debate was intense as the Chinese delegates made it clear that they viewed the entire process as an invasion of
43.
44.
45.
46.

Sub-Comm'n Res. 1989/5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/58, at 23 (1989).
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/52, at 2 (1990).
Id.
See Maher & Weissbrodt, The 41st Session of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 290, 304-06 (1990).
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their sovereignty. The Chinese delegation attempted to block the student
leader Wuer Kaixi from addressing the Commission on behalf of the Federation Internationale des Droits de I'Homme, 47 which only drew further
attention to the intervention. With Australia leading the way, it seemed that
a mild resolution cosponsored by Japan and seventeen Western countries
(members and observers) had a good chance of passage, despite unusually
strong lobbying by Beijing.
Nevertheless, no country came forward to introduce the resolution formally and when Pakistan moved to take no action on the resolution, its
motion carried seventeen-fifteen-eleven. 48 Voting for the motion were Bangladesh, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Iraq, Madagascar,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, the
USSR, and Yugoslavia. Voting against were the ten WEO countries, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Japan, Panama, and Swaziland. Abstaining were Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Colombia, Gambia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines,
Senegal, and Venezuela. The resolution's defeat came as several countries
inexplicably voted differently on the motion to take no action than they had
indicated they would on the substance of the resolution. Some observers
expected, for example, that India would abstain on the resolution but India
voted in favor of the motion to take no action.
F. Cuba
The United States introduced a resolution aimed at the reprisals that the
Cuban authorities reportedly took against witnesses who testified before the
delegation of six Commission members who visited Cuba in 1988. The text
of the resolution and the debate surrounding it were more subdued than in
prior years. The United States has made a censuring resolution against Cuba
its chief and, in some years, its only objective at the Commission. According
to an intercepted communique from Secretary of State James Baker released
by the Cuban delegation, the United States prepared "a high-level lobbying
effort tailored to individual countries." 4 9 Indeed, several members of the US
Congress visited the Commission to impress upon third world delegations
the importance of their vote on Cuba. At the 1989 session, the United States
had attempted to pass a harsh resolution against Cuba, and its campaign

47. Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, La Quarante-sixieme Session de la
Commission des Droits de l'Homme des Nations Unies 10, 11 (1990).
48. A procedural motion to take no action has priority over a motion on the resolution itself,
and must be voted upon first. See Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of
the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/5975/Rev.1, at 16 (1983) (Rule 65).
49. Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations at Geneva, Confidential State 026776,
Subject: Keeping the Heat on Cuba at the UNHRC (press release) (1990).
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had been embarrassingly disorganized, causing political division among
Commission members.5" The US campaign ultimately failed, and a weaker
Latin American proposal was adopted instead.51
The US task was made easier in 1990 by geopolitical changes that
occurred over the previous year, combined with a hardening of the Cuban
position, its increasing isolation, and reports of its retaliation against witnesses
who wanted to inform the Commission about violations. Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Panama voted with the United States, while Czechoslovakia and Poland,
as observers, co-sponsored the US resolution which passed by the comfortable margin of nineteen-twelve-twelve. The resolution expressed concern
over the reports of reprisals against witnesses, called on Cuba to respond to
those reports, asked the secretary-general to report to the next session on
on the agenda
his contacts with the Cuban government, and placed Cuba
52
of the 1991 Commission under item 12 for "violations.1

G. El Salvador
Once again, the Latin American group presented the traditional European
cosponsors with a draft text as a fait accompli. Nevertheless, the Latin American group did accept several amendments before the vote, to take into
account the deteriorating human rights situation, including the rise in summary executions evidenced by the murder of six Jesuit priests. The report of
the special rapporteur noted "a disturbing increase in government actions
of all kinds against trade union, peasant, humanitarian and other organizations."5 3 The government claimed that some of these organizations are
54
tied to the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN).
The final resolution passed by the Commission was more critical than in the
past, both of the government and the FMLN, whose offensive in San Salvador
probably cost it diplomatic points. The Commission expressed its serious
concern at "the increase in the number of grave, politically motivated violations of human rights, such as summary executions, torture and abductions,
and at the persistence of enforced disappearances."5 5 It strongly appealed
to the government of El Salvador and the FMLN to use the good offices of

50. Brody & Weissbrodt, Major Developments at the 1989 Session of the UN Commission
on Human Rights, 11 Hum. Rts. Q. 586, 594-95 (1989).
51. Id. at 594.
52. C.H.R. Res. 1990/48, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 109, 110
(1990).
53. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/26, at 25 (1990).
54. Id.
55. C.H.R. Res. 1990/77, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 156, 158
(1990).
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the UN secretary-general to endeavor to achieve "a negotiated political
solution to the armed conflict that will encourage the existence and strengthening of a democratic, pluralist and participatory process involving the promotion and respect of the human rights of the Salvadorian people .... ,-6

H. Guatemala
One of the hardest-fought battles at the Commission concerned Guatemala
which had, since the accession of a civilian government, been receiving
advisory services.5 7 Guatemala had succeeded in 1987 in removing itself
from the item of the Commission agenda that concerns "the violation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms" and instead was placed under the
"advisory services" item. While many of the same issues theoretically can
be discussed regardless of the agenda item, the symbolic significance of
transferring a country to the advisory services agenda item has become very
important in recent years. This development has both undermined the otherwise salutary intentions of the advisory services program and created an
artificial "prize" that countries under attack could seek to win by engaging
in various political maneuvers (often by seeking support from countries that
still consider the advisory services programs constructive vehicles for positive
change). In principle, an expert under the advisory services program cannot
find facts about human rights violations. In practice, the expert has wide
latitude as to how to present the human rights situation in the report.
The weaknesses of the advisory services program were particularly apparent in Guatemala during 1989-1990. In the past year there had been an
alarming escalation in political violence, accompanied by the continuation
of a longstanding pattern of severe human rights violations. Meanwhile, the
government has failed to assert its authority over military and paramilitary
groups, to protect those people who attempt to exercise their democratic
rights, or to investigate and prosecute those military and police forces who
are responsible for abuses. Four different reports by UN bodies submitted
on torture and disappearance, evito the Commission, including reports
5 8
situation.
worsening
this
denced
The degradation of the human rights situation again raised the question:
When and under what conditions should the United Nations provide a
government with advisory services? During the debate, the New York-based

56. Id. at 159-60.
57. See Brody & Weissbrodt, Major Developments at the 1989 Session of the UN Commission
on Human Rights, 11 Hum. Rts. Q. 586, 597 (1989).
58. E.g., U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/45 (1989); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/17, at 21 (1990); U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1990/13, at 31 (1990); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/22, at 39 (1990).
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Lawyers Committee for Human Rights issued a report on the advisory services
program in Guatemala which concluded that the program has had no effect
on Guatemala's dismal human rights situation and urged the Commission
on Human Rights to renew its commitment to monitor the ongoing human
rights abuses occurring in Guatemala through appointment of a special
rapporteur 5 9 The report of the advisory services expert, Hector Gros Espiell,
for his gentle treatment of the government, was pescriticized in the past
60
simistic this year.
In response to this worsening situation, the WEO group, led by Sweden,
introduced a resolution calling for the appointment of a special rapporteur
and transferring the Guatemalan discussion back to the "violations" item of
the agenda. 61 Several Latin American countries, however, prepared a competing resolution criticizing some of the worsening conditions in Guatemala,
but essentially preserving62the status quo, keeping Guatemala under the advisory services program.
The stakes were raised when, a few days before the vote, a Guatemalan
guard at the Swedish embassy in Guatemala was killed in what some observers believed may have been a reprisal against Sweden for its role in the
resolution. The Guatemalan foreign minister, who spoke to the Commission
the next day, did not refer to the incident.
In the end, a compromise resolution was approved unanimously, in part
because many of the Western countries were interested in currying favor
with the Latin American countries, whose votes would become critical a
few days later during the China debate. The resulting compromise resolution
amended the Latin American draft by raising the level of scrutiny one-half
notch and inventing a new hybrid. The Commission asked the secretarygeneral to appoint an "independent expert" as his representative to examine
the human rights situation in that country and, at the same time, to supervise
the provision of advisory services.6 3 This hybrid concept is novel, apparently
permitting a mixture of advisory services and factfinding duties. The resoservices) under
lution even left open the agenda item (violations or advisory
64
which it would consider this matter at its next session.

59. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Abandoning the Victims-The U.N. Advisory
Services Program in Guatemala 95-96 (1990).
60. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/45, supra note 58, at 19.
61. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/L.52/Rev.1, at 2 (1990).
62. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/L.37, at 4 (1990).
63. C.H.R. Res. 1990/80, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 165, 167
(1990).
64. See id. at 168.

1990

UN Commission on Human Rights

I. Haiti
Like Guatemala, Haiti represented, in the eyes of many, an abuse of the
advisory services program. In this case, however, the abuse consisted of the
absence of any demand for or use of advisory services. The thorough report
by the expert Philippe Texier (France) demonstrated how the military government of Haiti had used the formal existence of the program to avoid
proper scrutiny.65 The somewhat pessimistic, but basically realistic conclusions of Texier, for the second year running, together with the state of siege
declared on the island just as the Commission session began, indicated that
the Commission should put an end to the offer of advisory services to the
government of Haiti. Some Latin American delegations, which were apparently upset by the strong language used in Texier's report, as well as his visit
to the French and US embassies in Port-au-Prince but not to the Venezuelan
ambassador, balked at upgrading his mandate to that of a special rapporteur.
Finally, the chair of the Commission was asked to appoint an "independent
expert" to examine developments in the human rights situation in Haiti and
to report back to the Commission under the "violations" item 66-thus giving
to the mandate the content, but not the name of a special rapporteur. The
Latin American delegations agreed after the session to the appointment of
Texier for another year as the independent expert.

J. Iran
Beginning in 1988, the Commission resolution on Iran was not introduced
by any government, because no government wanted to face the risk that
Iran would cause its citizens to be taken hostage or would otherwise retaliate.
In 1989 the Commission had before it reports from the Special Rapporteur
on Executions, Amnesty International, and the special representative to Iran,
even though he was still denied access to the country. The reports presented
numerous accounts of human rights violations, including executions of political prisoners, arbitrary arrests, torture, and unfair trials. The Commission
adopted a resolution that urged Iran to grant access to the special representative and expressed concern over the numerous allegations of human rights
67
violations.

65. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/44, at 12-13 (1990).
66. C.H.R. Res. 1990/56, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 123, 124
(1990).
67. C.H.R. Res. 1989/66, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/86, at 152, 153-54
(1989).
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The Commission's special representative, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl (El
Salvador), was finally able to visit Iran shortly before the 1990 session began.
Although there were rumors that witnesses with whom he met were subsequently harassed, his report 8 was quite restrained. The special representative noted that it was physically impossible to accommodate everyone who
wanted to make a statement during his visit, and those who did obtain
appointments to meet with him were sometimes unable to keep them due
to the numbers of people crowding outside the UN office.6 9 The special
representative also prominently reported the government's concern about
terrorism, which was repeated by several witnesses he heard.7 0 In addition,
the representative received complaints of unlawful executions, torture, imprisonment beyond the expiration of the sentence,
and unfair trials, including
71
trials conducted without defense counsel.
Several observers believed the restraint manifested in the report was in
exchange for permission to conduct a second visit. The Commission's consensus resolution, also mild, welcomed the decision of the government to
invite Galindo Pohl and encouraged the government to comply with international instruments on human rights-including the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iran is a party-and to ensure that
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction enjoy the
rights recognized in these instruments. The resolution expressed concern
over testimony gathered by Galindo Pohl about human rights violations,
while "recogniz[ing] that testimony was also gathered representing the opposite and thus two different kinds of personal experience and view were
received." It also unusually "recognize[d] that the Special Representative
rules out allegations that political prisoners had been executed under false
charges of drug trafficking unless specific proof is submitted to him in this

regard ."72
K. Iraq
At the meeting of the Sub-Commission in August 1989, an Iraqi governmentsponsored NGO had invited individual Sub-Commission members to visit
Iraq to judge the human rights situation.7 3 Several observers believed, however, that if UN action on the human rights situation in that country was to
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/24 (1990).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 53.
C.H.R. Res. 1990/79, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 163, 164
(1990).
73. Maher & Weissbrodt, The 41st Session of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 290, 308 (1990).
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be deferred as a result of such an invitation, it would be necessary to ensure
that the visit took place in accordance with standard UN factfinding procedures. 74 Otherwise, a government could avoid responsibility for human
rights violations by inviting individual members (rather than the Sub-Commission qua Sub-Commission) for a visit to its territory without any of the
procedures normally accompanying UN factfinding visits. 75

Several western countries therefore proposed adraft decision welcoming
the invitation, asking the chair of the Sub-Commission to consult the experts
on the visit, asking the members to report on the visit to the Sub-Commission
at its next session, asking the secretary-general to facilitate the visit in accordance with UN practice, and asking the Sub-Commission to report to
the Commission the results of the visit. Iraq let it be known outside the public
debate, however, that it opposed this formalization of the visit through a
resolution which could be interpreted as a rebuke or result in agenda item
12 (violations) treatment. Voting on the resolution was delayed as the two
sides sought in vain to achieve a compromise. Iraq then moved to take no
action on the draft decision. Its motion carried eighteen-fourteen-nine. Once
again, the abstentions of Latin American democracies (Brazil, Colombia,
Peru, and Venezuela) provided the margin, while Argentina even voted in
favor of the motion to take no action.
The failure of the Commission to adopt any resolution on Iraq puts the
standing invitation extended to Sub-Commission members in a peculiar
status. The Sub-Commission normally is not authorized to visit in an official
capacity without direction from the Commission. If the Sub-Commission
members travel to Iraq in their unofficial, private capacities, however, their
authority is unclear. The government of Iraq nonetheless has indicated that
its invitation remains open, and the Sub-Commission has not resolved formally whether and under what conditions it might visit Iraq.
L. Israeli-Occupied Territories

Forthe firsttime in many years, the twelve states of the European Community
proposed a resolution on the Israeli Occupied Territories. The resolution
affirmed that "the settling of Israeli civilians in the Occupied Territories is
illegal and contravenes the relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention" and called upon the government of Israel to refrain from settling
immigrants in the Occupied Territories. 76 It passed unanimously, except for
74. See, e.g., Weissbrodt &McCarthy, Fact-Finding by International Nongovernmental Human
Rights Organizations, 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 1, 41-87 (1981).
75. Maher & Weissbrodt, The 41st Session of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 290, 308 (1990).
76. C.H.R. Res. 1990/1, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 15 (1990).
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an abstention by the United States. Another resolution condemned the ill
treatment and torture of Palestinian detainees and Israel's refusal to apply
77 A third resolution conthe protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
78
territory.
Syrian
occupied
demned abuses in
M. Lebanon
The Commission, voting forty-one to one (United States) with one abstention
(Swaziland), condemned the continued Israeli violations of human rights in
southern Lebanon.7 9 It called upon Israel to put an immediate end to such
practices and to implement the relevant resolutions of the Security Council
which require the immediate, total, and unconditional withdrawal of Israel
from all Lebanese territory and respect for the sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity of Lebanon. 80 During the session, the Commission
chair appealed for a cease-fire in East Beirut.
N. Myanmar (Burma)
Under the confidential 1503 procedure, a French-sponsored resolution was
reportedly adopted by consensus asking the chair to appoint an independent
expert to establish direct contacts with the government on developments
relating to the human rights situation in Myanmar and to report to the
Commission at its next session.
0. Panama
The United States sought to avoid Commission debate on its December 1989
invasion of Panama, arguing thatto do so would "politicize" the Commission
with an issue already discussed (and with a resolution censuring the US
military intervention) by the General Assembly. Mexico pointed out, however, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had been condemned regularly
by the Commission. The International Commission of Jurists intervened to
refute the United States' purported justifications8' under international law
for the military action. Finally, a Cuban-sponsored resolution to condemn

77. C.H.R. Res. 1990/2, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. FJCN.4/1990194, at 15, 18 (1990).
78. C.H.R. Res. 1990/3, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 18-20 (1990).
79. C.H.R. Res. 1990/54, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 121 (1990).

80. Id.
81. See, e.g., D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 Am.
J. Int!l L. 516 (1990).
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the invasion as a violation of the Panamanian people's right to self-determination was adopted fourteen-eight-seventeen. 2 Notable were the abstentions by several US allies (Belgium, France, Spain, Sweden) as well as several
Latin American governments, and the vote of all five Eastern European countries in favor of the resolution. Counter-proposals submitted by the United
States and Panama were withdrawn before the Commission could vote on
them.

P. Romania
The special rapporteur on Romania appointed in 1989, Joseph Voyame
(Switzerland), who was denied entry into Romania before the fall of Ceausescu, was able to visit that country during the Commission's session and
reported back on the important changes which had occurred. 3 With the
agreement of the new authorities, the Commission, noting "the considerable
improvement in respect for human rights that has taken place in Romania,"
renewed the special rapporteur's mandate for a further year. 4 This step was
seen as an important precedent. By contrast, when dictatorships fell in Guatemala and Haiti in 1987, the Commission rapidly terminated the mandate
of the special rapporteurs, only to find that the human rights situation did
not improve. Similarly, some criticized as premature the termination of the
mandate of the special rapporteur for Chile this year.

Q. South Africa
Commission debate reflected the changing situation in South Africa and the
liberation of Nelson Mandela, which occurred during the session. The Commission received reports from the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on
southern Africa,85 the Group of Three established under the Apartheid Convention,8 6 and the Sub-Commission expert Ahmed Khalifa (Egypt) on corporations doing business in South Africa."' The Commission adopted a res-

82.
83.
84.
85.

C.H.R. Res. 1990/10, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 37 (1990).
See U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/28 & Add.1 (1990).
C.H.R. Res. 1990/50, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 112 (1990).
U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/7 (1989) & Add.1 (1990). The Working Group includes Mikuin
Leliel Balanda (Zaire), Humberto Diaz Casanueva (Chile), Felix Ermacora (Austria), BranimirJankovic (Yugoslavia), Mulka G. Reddy (India), and Elly E.E. Mtango (United Republic
of Tanzania).
86. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/35 (1990). The International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVlII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 30) at 166, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), entered into force 18 July 1976.
87. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/9 (1989) & Add.1 (1990).
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olution by consensus on the detention and torture of children88 while it voted
on another inviting the international community not to ease sanctions against
South Africa until further progress is made. 89 Efforts to arrive at a consensus
text for this resolution failed, primarily over the issue of whether sanctions
should be considered mandatory or discretionary.
A third resolution, adopted by a vote of thirty-one to eight with four
abstentions, condemned "the assistance rendered by the major Western
States and Israel to South Africa in the political, economic, financial and
particularly the military field ....90
The Commission approved a resolution forwarded to it from the SubCommission, renewing Khalifa's mandate to report on banks and corporations that do business with South Africa and calling upon all governments
to cooperate with Khalifa's efforts and to disseminate his report.992' The vote
on this resolution was thirty-two to eight with three abstentions.
The Commission also addressed actions of the South African government
under its agenda item on self-determination and colonial domination. By a
vote of thirty-two to two with nine abstentions, the Commission condemned
censorship and other practices of the South African government and condemned "the wanton acts of aggression and destabilization perpetrated by
the apartheid regime of South Africa against front-line and other neighboring
States ....,193

The Group of Three was asked to continue its work under the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, including the examination of legal action "which may be taken
under the Convention against transnational corporations whose operations
in South Africa come under the crime of apartheid.

.

,94 The Ad Hoc

Working Group also was asked to continue its reporting on human rights
violations in southern Africa.95

88. C.H.R. Res. 1990/11, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 38 (1990).
89. C.H.R. Res. 1990/26, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. F/CN.4/1990/94, at 71, 75 (1990).
90. C.H.R. Res. 1990/22, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 61, 63 (1990).
Countries voting against the resolution were Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States. Abstentions included
Japan, Panama, Spain, and Ukraine.
91. C.H.R. Res. 1990/23, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/94, at 66 (1990).
92. Countries voting against the resolution were Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States. Japan, Spain, and Ukraine
abstained.
93. C.H.R. Res. 1990/8, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 31, 33-34
(1990).
94. C.H.R. Res. 1990/12, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 40, 42 (1990).
The resolution passed by a vote of thirty-two to two with nine abstentions.
95. C.H.R. Res. 1990/26, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 71, 76 (1990).
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R. Western Sahara
Following the consensus reached at the General Assembly, reflecting the
talks underway between the king of Morocco and the Polisario, the Coma resolution on self-determission for the first time adopted without a vote
96
mination for the people of the Western Sahara.

S. Confidential "1503" Procedure
The Commission failed to take action on the Sub-Commission decision to
postpone consideration of all communications not received by the working
group on communications at least five months prior to the working group's
session in late July.97 This postponement will result in 1503 complaints that
are more than one year old by the time the Commission on Human Rights
considers any situations that are referred by the Sub-Commission. Such dated
information may impede Commission deliberations under the 1503 procedure. 98
The Commission also did not act on the Sub-Commission resolution
allowing 1503 decisions to be voted by secret ballot. Previously, the SubCommission had used the secret ballot only for elections. 99 The proponents
of the resolution argued that, due to the politically sensitive nature of the
Sub-Commission's consideration of gross human rights violations under the
1503 procedure, the secret ballot was necessary to protect the independence
of Sub-Commission members from political pressure. 100
The Commission had before it allegations of gross violations involving
Brunei, Haiti, Myanmar, Paraguay, and Somalia. It dropped consideration
of Brunei, where the long-term prisoners in question had been released,
transferred Haiti to public scrutiny (see above), and suggested that Paraguay
apply for advisory services. Somalia was left pending, while an independent
expert, as described above, was appointed for Myanmar.

96. C.H.R. Res. 1990/4, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 20 (1990).
97. See Maher & Weissbrodt, The 41st Session of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 290, 304 n.63 (1990). The
Commission apparently was sympathetic or indifferent to the Sub-Commission's desire
to give governments at least five months to respond to communications.
98. Id. at 304.
99. van Boven, The United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 7 Netherlands Q. Hum. Rts. 464, 467 (1989).
100. See id.
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T. Other Countries
The Commission once again failed even to consider action regarding some
of the worst situations. Abundant evidence, including that gathered by the
Commission's own thematic procedures, pointed to Colombia, Peru, the
Philippines, and Sri Lanka as countries with mass violations. The genocide
against the Yanomami Indians in Brazil was ignored by all but a few NGOs,
as were the troubling situations in Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, and Zaire.

III. THEMATIC MECHANISMS
The thematic mechanisms, established by the Commission to examine specific types of human rights violations everywhere in the world, have proved
in the ten years since the creation of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances to be the most effective and objective monitoring
bodies of the international community. As noted above in Section I of this
article, the mandate of those mechanisms became one of the issues at stake
in the "enhancement" debate. The draft resolutions on torture, executions,
and disappearances, prepared by WEO countries, would have extended
their mandates for longer than the current two years. The Group of 77
countries countered by threatening to have the mandates reduced to one
year. In the end, all the mandates were again extended for two years, although
the agreement reached at ECOSOC will mean three-year mandates in the
future.

A. Disappearances
In the past ten years, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has transmitted some 19,000 qualifying cases to governments
in all parts of the world. 1° 1 In 1989 alone, it dealt with 721 new cases,
described as "an alarming increase" over the 1988 figure of 400.102 Once
again, Peru topped the list, with 404 cases reported to have occurred in
1989, followed by Iran (121), Guatemala (forty), the Philippines (thirty-six),
0 3
El Salvador (thirty-four), and Sri Lanka (thirty-three).'
Since its establishment ten years ago, the working group has been the
most effective of the Commission's theme mechanisms. It has been the
cornerstone of international efforts to help relatives in their search for the

101.

U.N. Doc. _/CN.4/1990/13, at 87 (1990).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 29, 35, 46, 62, 68, 74.
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victims of disappearances and in working to prevent future disappearances.
Its methods of work, including its urgent action procedure, its practice of
providing feedback to the sources of information, and its reporting on the
substance of cases transmitted, have served as a model for the other thematic
procedures. Of the thematic mechanisms, only the working group invites
the authors of complaints to comment upon the official responses of governments so as to help judge the veracity of the response.
In its concluding observations, the working group looked back on its
first decade. It reiterated the view that disappearances "constitute the most
comprehensive denial of human rights in our time," violating "practically
all basic human rights of a disappeared person." 0 4 It reviewed the relationship between disappearances and states of emergency. 05 The group
identified impunity as "perhaps the single most important factor contributing
to the phenomenon of disappearances," confirming the "age-old adage that
impunity breeds contempt for the law."' 0 6 Among the factors leading to
judicial
impunity are the use of military courts, institutional paralysis of the
0 7
system, and the lack of an effective habeas corpus mechanism.
The US delegation proposed, in a closed WEO meeting, to abolish the
working group, on the ground that it was established in answer to Argentina's
dirty war tactics of 1975 through 1979 and had outlived its usefulness.10 8
The United States proposed to consolidate the group with the special rapporteur on executions in one mandate, on the rationale that most of the
disappeared are eventually killed. The idea met with unanimous rejection
by the rest of the WEO group and dismay from the NGO community, but
is reportedly part of a larger US plan, not fully announced yet, which calls
for the eventual termination of all thematic mechanisms except for rapporteurs on political killings and disappearances (combined), torture, and religious intolerance, as well as a future rapporteur on free elections.
Several NGOs suggested that the Commission could enhance the role
of the working group by giving more attention to the recommendations in
its report when adopting resolutions. This suggestion related to both general
recommendations, as well as those appeals addressed to specific countries
which have either not cooperated with the working group or have failed to
carry out the recommendations addressed to them as a result of country
visits. The Netherlands remarked that the Commission "has thus far been
rather meek in insisting on feedback" from governments on country-specific

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1990/13, supra note 101, at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Guest, Proposal to Disband UN's Human Rights Sleuths Angers Activists, The Guardian
(London), 26 Feb. 1990.
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recommendations.10 9 As a result of the lobbying by the International Commission of Jurists, the resolution 110 adopted bythe Human Rights Commission
for the first time emphasized the need for governments to ensure prompt
and impartial investigations of alleged disappearances and the importance
of maintaining habeas corpus even in states of emergency. The Commission
resolution also called on the Sub-Commission to complete its work on the
draft declaration on disappearances. " '

B. Executions
The special rapporteur on summary or arbitrary executions, Amos Wako
(Kenya), reported more than 1,500 alleged cases of extrajudicial executions
in forty-eight countries." 2 He noted a rise in death threats, in particular
against judges, lawyers, human rights activists, public office holders, trade
unionists, educators, journalists, witnesses to crimes, and opposition leaders. 113 Citing the report of the Centre for the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers on the "Harassment and Persecution of Judges and Lawyers," he
also looked at the phenomenon of human rights defenders as victims of
summary or arbitrary executions. 1 4 On a positive note, he considered ECOSOC's 1989 adoption of the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions to be a "milestone" for his mandate and annexed the Principles to his report." s The
special rapporteur commended the contribution made by nongovernmental
organizations, in particular by the Minnesota Lawyers International Human
6
Rights Committee, in promoting the principles."
In pursuing his mandate, he visited Colombia and Suriname. His report
on Colombia detailed assassinations committed during the past four years
against union leaders (259), teachers (129), and members of the left wing
Union Patriotica (567).Y1 It also listed seventy-three "massacres" of more
than four persons in 1988 and twenty-one between January and August
1989.118 As with last year's report on Colombia by the working group on

109. Cf. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/13, supra note 101, at 85 (Commission responding to criticism).
110. See C.H.R. Res. 1990/30, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/94, at 84, 8586(1990).
111. Id. at 85.
112. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/22, at 2, 3 (1990).
113. Id. at 103.
114. Id. at 104.
115. Id. at 105.
116. Id.
117. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/22/Add.1, at 20, 21, 22 (1990).
118. See id. at 16-19.
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disappearances, the Commission took no action on the Colombia report,
failing to even mention Colombia in the resolution extending the special
rapporteur's mandate. 119
C. Torture
The special rapporteur on torture, Peter Kooijmans (Netherlands), summarized his communications with governments concerning cases of alleged
torture reported to him. 120 This practice, already used by the special rapporteur on executions and the working group on disappearances, provides
a much more vivid picture of the practices alleged to take place in particular
countries and places a greater burden on the countries in question to respond
adequately to the allegations. The special rapporteur noted that torture "still
remains a common phenomenon in today's world,"' 2' and pointed to the
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment' 22 as a "checklist," 1 23 compliance with which

"would make torture during detention or imprisonment virtually impossi-

ble." 124 He made a number of recommendations, most of which were con-

tained in his earlier reports. Among these recommendations were that "incommunicado detention should be prohibited" and that detainees should
25
be given access to legal counsel no later than twenty-four hours after arrest.1
During the year, the special rapporteur sent fifty-one urgent appeals to
twenty-six countries (receiving replies from only thirteen) 26 and carried out
missions to Guatemala, Honduras, and Zaire in response to invitations by
those governments. Before his visit to Guatemala, he visited exiles in Costa
Rica to discuss the situation with them. Importantly, he also published reto recommendations he made after
sponses from South Korea and Turkey
27
visits to those countries last year.'
Several countries stressed that the roles of the special rapporteur and
the Committee against Torture were complementary and that the exchange
of information between the two should be increased. Switzerland also suggested that the special rapporteur use country visits to encourage ratification
of the Convention against Torture.
119. See C.H.R. Res. 1990/51, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 113-15
(1990).
120. See U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1990/17, at 1 (1989).
121. Id. at 81.
122. G.A. Res. 43/173, 43 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.49), U.N. Doc. A/43/49, at 297 (1988).
123. U.N. Doc. FCN.4/1990/17, supra note 120, at 81.
124. Id. at 83.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 5.
127. Id. at 76-80.

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Vol. 12

D. Mercenaries
of Peru,
The special rapporteur on mercenaries, Enrique Bernales Ballesteros
1 28
Colombia, 129
presented a report on mercenary activity against Angola,
Comoros, 130 Maldives,' 3 1 and Nicaragua.1 32 As a result of visits to Nicaragua

and the United States, he was able to provide great detail, particularly in
his report to the General Assembly, on the use of mercenaries in the USsponsored aggression against Nicaragua. He also looked at the collusion
between mercenaries and drug traffickers, 133 as in the case of Colombia,
and the vulnerability of small island states, such as Comoros and Maldives,
to mercenary activity.

34

At its 1989 session, the General Assembly adopted the International
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mer3
As the Convention contains no monitoring mechanism, 136 the
cenaries.'1

Commission asked the special rapporteur to include in his future reports
information on the state of ratifications and the mode of application of the
Convention.

37

IV. SUB-COMMISSION ELECTIONS
In keeping with the new four-year terms of Sub-Commission members, half
the experts stood for reelection in 1990. One of the most closely watched
elections was in the WEO group, where China had lobbied strongly against
Louis Joinet (France) as architect of the Sub-Commission's resolution criticizing the suppression of the prodemocracy movement. Joinet was easily
elected, however, as were the two other incumbents, Daes (Greece) and
Palley (UK), defeating a challenge by a Spanish candidate.
In Eastern Europe, Stanislav Chernichenko (USSR) was reelected unopposed. In Africa, where eleven candidates sought three positions, Attah
(Nigeria) and Ksentini (Algeria) were reelected together with El Hadji Guisse
(Senegal), while incumbent Agboyibor (Togo) was defeated. Asian experts
Tian Jin (China) and AI-Khasawneh (Jordan) were reelected together with
Rajindar Sachar (India) who was nominated in the place of Bhandare after
the defeat of the Congress party with which he was closely connected. In

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/11 , at 25-26 (1990).
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 26-27, 29-30.
G.A. Res. 44/34, U.N. Press Release GA/7977, at 590 (1990).
See id. at 590-95.
C.H.R. Res. 1990/7, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 27, 30 (1990).
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Latin America, Leandro Despouy (Argentina), who was renominated despite
a change of governments and with strong support from human rights activists,
was reelected together with new members Claude Heller (Mexico) and Gilberto Vergne Saboia (Brazil), while incumbent Luis Varela Quiros (Costa
Rica) was defeated.

V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
The Commission also discussed and took action on several other issues,
which are discussed individually below.

A. Armed Opposition Groups
Peru and Colombia proposed a draft resolution which would have set up a
working group to study violations of human rights by armed opposition
groups and drug traffickers. Nongovernmental human rights groups, together
with several delegations, opposed the resolution because, among other reasons, they felt that the Commission should not dedicate its energy to studying
and reporting on these entities rather than on government actions. A revised
resolution was presented, however, calling on existing special rapporteurs
to "pay particular attention to the activities of irregular armed groups and
drug traffickers" in their reports and asking the secretary-general to collect
information on these questions.' 38
Peru made clear that its resolution was not aimed at national liberation
movements but at irregular bands seeking to overthrow democratically
elected governments and that it did not intend to diminish state responsibility
for protecting human rights. On a roll-call vote, the resolution was adopted
with only Cuba and Sweden abstaining. Mexico criticized the ambiguity of
the term "irregular armed groups," stating that there was no clear difference
between such groups and national liberation movements and noting that
the word "irregular" has no precise meaning. 139 It also criticized the magnitude of the request to the secretary-general.

B. Cooperation with UN Rapporteurs
Responding to allegations that individuals meeting with the special rapporteur on Iran and the Commission delegates visiting Cuba in 1988 suffered

138. C.H.R. Res. 1990175, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. EICN.411990194, at 153, 154
(1990).
139. U.N. Press Release HR/2566, at 5 (1990).
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reprisals, and to a draft law in El Salvador that would penalize those who
give harmful information to UN bodies, the Commission called on governments to "allow unhampered contacts between private individuals" and UN
representatives, and on the secretary-general to submit information to its
next session "on reprisals against witnesses or victims of human rights violations." 4 '
C. Minorities
Progress in democratic political systems throughout central Europe unfortunately has also been marked by the increasing visibility of ethnic and
national rivalries. As a consequence, the Commission finally, after four decades of reluctance, provisionally adopted a draft declaration prepared by
an open-ended working group on the rights of persons belonging to national,
ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities.' The Centre for Human Rights
42
will prepare a technical review of the text for next year's second reading.
The Vienna Concluding Document of 1989 within the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe contains stronger and perhaps more
useful commitments for the protection of minorities than does the Commission draft. Hence, in reviewing its draft, the Commission might find useful
guidance in the Vienna Concluding Document. One question posed by the
events of this past year is whether the human rights structures developed
since World War Ifcan be used effectively during the next decade to prevent
the sort of human rights violations which occurred in central Europe during
the earlier part of this century. This problem undoubtedly will present many
challenges to those countries and to the Commission as well as to other
international bodies charged with addressing the rights of minorities.
D. Independence of Judges and Lawyers
The Commission declared that it was "[dlisturbed at the continued harassment and persecution of judges and lawyers in many countries" and endorsed
the Sub-Commission's decision to ask Louis Joinet to prepare a working
paper on means by which the Sub-Commission could monitor the implementation of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and
the protection of practicing lawyers. The Commission also recommended
that the Eighth Congress on Crime Prevention and Control
consider adoption
43
of the Draft Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.
140.
141.
142.
143.

C.H.R. Res. 1990/76, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 155-56(1990).
See C.H.R. Res. 1990/45, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 106 (1990).
Id.
C.H.R. Res. 1990/33, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 91-92 (1990).
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E. Advisory Services
Responding to widespread concerns, the secretary-general's report on the
advisory services program gave a clearer definition of the program's priorities.'" A 1989 joint statement by eleven NGOs asserted that the promotional
work of the advisory services programme must not be allowed to replace
or undermine the monitoring programme of this Commission. 45 This year,
the Commission recognized the mistake it made in 1987 by returning Haiti
to item 12 (violations) and by leaving that possibility open for Guatemala.
The under-secretary-general also made it clear that UN assistance is not an
146
exemption from scrutiny.

F. Other Actions
In other actions, the Commission,
-placed the question of implementation of the Convention on the Rights
47
of the Child on next year's agenda;1
-adopted the guidelines on computerized personal files prepared by
Sub-Commission expertJoinet and transmitted them to the General Assembly
48
for final adoption;
-over the opposition of the United States and Japan, noted the impact
of debt induced structural adjustment policies on the enjoyment of human
149
rights;
-endorsed the decision of the Sub-Commission to initiate a study on
the right to a fair trial.' 50

VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Commission's session was marked by a growing north-south division,
both on substantive issues and on the future of the Commission itself. On
two key votes concerning human rights violations, China and Iraq, the northern countries stood virtually alone. The abstentions by Latin American countries came as major disappointments. For years, the Latin American countries
have complained, justifiably, that the Commission has been selective in its

144.
145.
146.
147.

See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/43 (1990).
See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/SR.53/Add.2, 22 (1989).
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/SR.1, at 7 (1990).
C.H.R. Res. 1990/74, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 152, 153
(1990).
148. C.H.R. Res. 1990/42, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 103 (1990).
149. C.H.R. Res. 1990/24, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 66-68 (1990).
150. C.H.R. Res. 1990/108, ESCOR Supp. (No.2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, at 173 (1990).
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condemnation of abuses-taking up violations in Latin America while ignoring those on other continents. Now, when the chance came to remedy
that imbalance, the Latin Americans inexplicably abstained. Interestingly,
the Latin American countries, which have traditionally shown little interest
in Haiti, adopted it this year in arguing for a milder text on Haiti's behalf,
thus bolstering the Latin Americans' selectivity argument.
The resolutions on Guatemala and Haiti, which increased scrutiny of
both countries by only half a notch despite grave human rights problems,
illustrated just how hard it is to appoint new special rapporteurs. Nevertheless, by creating new forms of mandates short of the traditional special
rapporteurs, the Commission perhaps made the process more flexible by
opening the possibility of a middle level of scrutiny.
The increased voice that will rightly be given to developing countries
underscores the long-term need for the human rights movement to develop
constituencies in those countries that will help press governments to take
pro-human rights stands on international issues. For the first time this year,
as one diplomat from Eastern Europe noted, governments in that region had
to explain to their people their votes on issues such as human rights in China.
Yet democratic, pluralistic countries such as Argentina faced no such pressure. Did any of the active human rights groups in Buenos Aires know their
government had voted with Saddam Hussein to prevent real scrutiny of Iraq?
The vigorous Argentine press certainly did not report it. Similarly, in countries
such as India and Pakistan, where new governments have shown themselves
responsive to the demands of social action groups at the domestic level, no
change was seen in their positions at the Commission. Again, did the Indian
press or public-or the human rights activists appointed to high government
positions-know that its government had voted against UN criticism of the
Tiananmen massacre? Making sure that a domestic human rights constituency is developed in those countries will be an important challenge for
human rights advocates during the decade ahead.
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